Sustainability of Policy and Program Reforms and Initiatives

Our signature approach to understanding institutional and organizational performance in the context of policy reforms and programme initiatives.

All policies have natural life cycles: they should change and adapt to circumstances, they may expand to reach new clients and evolve to assist beneficiaries in new ways; and when they become less relevant to society’s changing needs, they may be replaced by new policies. If we benchmark new policies and programs against this realistic standard then the issue of sustainability comes down to whether or not the institutional mechanisms are in place to ensure the new initiatives being put in place will follow that standard pattern, in a good way.

Here we highlight the model of “institutional mechanisms” that we have developed over time and applied in our work.

The Model: Institutional Arrangements for Sustainability.

The institutional arrangements for sustainability have to combine two separate aspects with regard to effective policy delivery: the “drivers” of policy and the “enablers” of policy. 

The drivers of policy delivery by ministries and agencies are the arrangements in place for holding the ministry or agency accountable for performance and results, and for taking or enforcing corrective action by the ministry when necessary.  The enablers of policy delivery by ministries and agencies responsible are the access on reasonable terms and conditions to five key resources needed for performance in the public sector, namely: budget, personnel, assets, information, and authority or the mandate to act.  If the drivers are not in place there is no assurance that a ministry will continue with the proper implementation of a policy or program.  And if the enablers, i.e. the key resources needed, are not available then the Ministry cannot be held accountable or be blamed for a failure to perform.

Drivers of Policy

In this section we sketch a simple “policy driver” system based on our work experience with various governments. Let us take here the exemple of a typical social policy reform by the gouvernement of Indonesia (GOI).

The ultimate ‘driver’ of policy is the President, or the Cabinet he has appointed. To achieve that top level control with regard to the delivery of results, it is necessary to set up a system of performance accountability that provides the top of government with a regular periodic check on the specific policy performance of national ministries and agencies at local level.  This is an essential part of the machinery of government for managing social policies, and in GOI’s case this apparatus is still largely missing.  However, the elements of such a system are already falling into place.  Much effort has so far gone into the development of traditional M&E and MIS systems, but these systems do not satisfy this requirement.  Such traditional monitoring systems are largely “supply side” operations and provide information for internal management purposes by agencies and ministries.  They fall into the class of “enablers”, not “drivers”.  What is needed in addition is a system of monitoring that is “demand side” meaning related to the needs of beneficiaries, villages, communities, based perhaps at the level of district governments or below, and reporting upward to the head of state separately and independently of the national organs of government.  This is the way to create the “governance sandwich” in which ministries that do not perform can be put under consistent pressure to change and improve. 

Enablers of Policy
We identify five key resources as the basic enablers of policy delivery.  Yet, we should recognize that it is often not the amount of each resource that matters, so much as the terms and conditions on which a ministry or agency can get access to the resource, in the form and at the time it needs it. The amount of budgetis important, but what may be more critical is the timing of budget releases, or the precise terms on which the budget can be disbursed. Having enough personnel is important, but what may be more critical is the ability to assign staff, reward staff and promote staff for superior performance.  Assets are important, but can they be maintained, operated and assigned to the locations where they are most useful?  Information is critical to good decision-making, but only if it comes in time, and in a form that makes sense to the users. Has the M&E system been properly “reverse-engineered” from the decision processes that it is supposed to improve and enhance?  And having the authority to act is critical, but the way that authority is used may easily be counter-productive, and can even create antagonisms that lead to performance sabotage. 

A second issue is that ministries and agencies already have their own access to the key resources. What each new initiative requires is that this access be sufficient, and not a constraint to delivery.  It is not always necessary to assign new resources for every new policy.  Obviously there is a natural temptation for any organization that is given a new mandate to use that assignment as a basis for negotiating access to more resources.

Budget

There are two parts to the budget issue.  First, when transfer payments have to be made the budget line and the estimate should be able to accommodate the planned transfer, and the timing of releases may have to be negotiated in advance, to fit the timing of payments.  Second, the operational budget should be adequate to support the program, especially in regard to local level participation of central officials with district and provincial officials, and the operation of internal information systems such as MIS and M&E. 

Personnel

The assignment of adequate levels and numbers of personnel should be assured.  In addition it is necessary to ensure that policy and program delivery is explicitly reflected in the staff performance evaluation system; that properly trained personnel are hired where necessary; that there is enough operational budget to allow them to perform adequately; and that the process of staff assignments and promotions is aligned with the management needs of the programs.

Assets

For most purposes this category covers transport, communications, IT, and office accommodation.  These requirements may not be adequately met in certain locations without special effort.  The concern here can be that the roll out of pilot programs nationally becomes biased, and is done in a way that is not pro-poor, because of the distribution of assets across a given country.

Information

M&E and MIS systems are designed to enable agencies and ministries to manage themselves and their activities more effectively.  They are essentially “supply side” because they are primarily for self-monitoring by ministries and agencies.  There is a symbiotic relationship (rather akin to a “predator: prey” model in ecology) between the external demand side information system and the internal supply side.  For example, if the benchmarking system of policy delivery indicators shows that there is an unexpected but serious gender imbalance in policy delivery, then attention would promptly swing to the use of internal systems to guide corrective action by the ministry. Unfortunately if this is truly an unexpected event, then the internal M&S system will probably not have gathered relevant data, and will now need to be rapidly updated to do so.  But that can be done.  In addition to operational performance data there is the issue of technical and scientific information required for policy management.  However, such information is normally accessed in the form of “experts”, and comes ready packaged in that way.  So it falls under the heading of “personnel”. 

Authority

It is normal but not good practice to give agencies responsibility without adequate authority.  In a well run world, authority should exceed responsibility, but it is usually the other way around.  This needs to be checked in practice, to see that the requisite authority is available.  There is no fixed way to settle this.  Cultural norms differ somewhat, and there is also a range of ways that programs can be delegated.  A central agency may feel it needs more authority than it actually does because it thinks its job is to give detailed instructions to local implementers on what they have to do. In practice, if the program can be delegated so that the SNG takes responsibility for much of it, then the authority needed at the centref or exercising strategic oversight may be much less than if it tries to manage all the operational details.  Perhaps the best way to approach this is to ask how the program or the policy can be delivered with the existing authority, and then ask what improvements can be achieved by additional authority.  A final point is that every assignment of authority should be matched by accountability.